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John Kimberly introduced the term “exnovation” in 1981, defining it essentially as the removal 
of an innovation from an organization in order to provide space for new innovation(s). Unfortunately, 
the term has not achieved prominent status in the management vocabulary. Other terms, such as 
elimination, termination, abandonment, disinvestment or unlearning are frequently used to describe 
essentially the same phasing out phenomenon. On the other hand, many authors who are using the term 
exnovation are referring to phenomena that differ from what Kimberly had in mind. There seems to be 
an urgent need for either abandoning the concept of exnovation, or give it a re-birth. The rate of 
innovation and change in society, and the need for transitions to more sustainable products and 
processes, suggest that a re-birth may be appropriate. In the present article we suggest a redefinition of 
the exnovation concept; we suggest sunk cost-theory as a default, rational-economic criterion for 
exnovation decisions; we further identify cognitive, emotional, and behavioral barriers to exnovtion, 
and we identify de-biasing approaches to exnovation decisions. We also suggest areas for further 
research and improved practice.   
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It is generally accepted that John R. Kimberly was the first to introduce the term exnovation.  
He defined exnovation as the removal of an innovation from an organization, and he argued in 
innovation-cyclical terms:  exnovation takes place “when an organization divests itself of an innovation 
in which it had previously invested” (Kimberley, 1981, p. 91).  In another early work, co-authored with 
Michael J. Evanisco,  exnovation was defined as “.. a process whereby an organization decide to divest 
itself of an innovation that it had previously adopted” (Kimberley & Evanisko, 1981, p. 710).   
John Kimberly’s scholarly work has been the main inspiration for writing this article.  It seemed 
to us that his writings provided an important combination of in-to (innovation) and out-from 
(exnovation) issues of change in organizations (cf. Kanter, Stein, & Jick, 1992, p. 503).  As Kimberly 
(2014, p. 3) noted in a comment on empirical findings from the field of medicine: “If innovation has to 
do with getting something new successfully introduced, exnovation has to do with the other end of the 
process”.  In this “other end”, old innovations often need to be discarded, in order for new programs, 
technologies, and products to be embraced.  However, what needs to be discarded, is often not discarded. 
Kimberly (2014) calls this problem “the exnovation conundrum”.  
The “exnovation conundrum” is in focus in the present article. After a broad review of the 
literature we have come to the conclusion that “what needs to be discarded” – the exnovation content – 
in order to provide space for new innovations (i.e. what needs to be exnovated) may not always be 
limited to old innovations, but may also include whatever else needs to be removed or modified in order 
to provide space for the new innovation.   Before providing the arguments for this expansion of 
exnovation content we shall review some of the notions of “phasing out phenomena” found in the 
relevant literature. 
 
DEFINITIONS  AND  DELIMITATIONS   
In semantics, onomasiology and semasiology represent different aspects of an analytic process 
aimed at establishing a clearer understanding of the relationship between objects, words/names, 
concepts, and meanings (Algeo, 1978; Baldinger, 1964, 1980; Geeraerts, 2002).  
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The onomasiological question asks about names and words that can be used homonymously to 
express an idea or describe an object, and about the process of ending up recommending one word over 
the others. As we shall see, there appears to be a great deal of confusion about the term exnovation. 
The semasiological issue is about how one word (in our case exnovation) may give rise to many 
different meanings, and about the need to seek a unified understanding of the word. A main purpose of 
the present article is to suggest a definition and a framework for such a unified understanding.  
The Onomasiological Issue 
In the study of exnovation-type phenomena, most contributions start with the fact that very often 
something has to be removed before a new innovation can be adopted. The onomasiological question, 
then, is about the many names and words that can be used to express this idea, and how we come to end 
up recommending one word over the others.  
In the case of exnovation, the relevant literature is ripe with alternative names used by different 
authors who describe essentially what Kimberly had in mind, without using the word exnovation.  
Termination issues. First of all, there is a strong emphasis in relevant literature, that sooner or 
later an innovation needs to be somehow terminated. Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbek (1973) described 
the “rejection” or “discontinuing” of an innovation.  Albert (1984) pointed out that the management of 
innovation should include “management of termination”. Others have noticed the “fad” aspect of many 
managerial innovations and the need for “rejection” and “disappearance” of such innovations 
(Abrahamson, 1991), “collapse” or “elimination” (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999),  “demise” or 
“cessation” (Carson, Lanier, Carson, & Guidry, 2000), “demoting and rejecting” (Abrahamson & 
Eisenman, 2008). 
Peter Drucker was an early advocate of “total overhawl” of company rules and regulations (1985). 
Along the same lines, Brenneman reported on Continental Airlines’ public burning of an 800 pages rule 
book and replacing it with an 80 page manual (1998). Richard Foster made a Wall Street Journal call 
for “junking the old” (1985) in order to  make an effective transition from old to new technology. In the 
public sector Yin (1979, p. 180) referred to how a “displaced practice” would give room for 
improvisation and innovation, leading to new practices and routines, eventually ending up at a 
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“disappearance stage” – as a final stage of innovation. Clark and Staunton presented a modified version 
of Yin’s model (1989, p. 207), where they replaced Yin’s term “displaced practice (if relevant)” with 
the term “to be exnovated” as a precondition for innovation. Also, political scientists have written about 
the need for “organizational termination” and “policy dis-continuation” in the public field (Bardach, 
1976; Daniels, 1995). 
In the area of industrial management and strategy, Avlonitis (1983/1984, p. 46) wrote about the 
necessity of “product elimination” and “eliminating activities” in British engineering companies, and 
about the absence of procedures guiding the “product elimination process”.  In his dissertation on 
renewal in the automobile industry, Vekstein discarded the term exnovation in favor of “outnovation”, 
seeing the divestment of problematic technologies and routines as a continuous process, not as a stage 
of an innovation cycle, and not limited to previous innovations (Vekstein, 1993). Abraham and Hayward 
applied the term “discontinuance” both to “the cessation of innovation production by a supplier and the 
termination of innovation usage by an adoptor” (1984, p. 209). Dranikoff, Koller and Schneider  
identified “divestiture” as a missing link in the business strategy field (2002), while Haynes, Thompson 
and Wright found that “voluntary divestment”, leading to reduced diversification, had a positive impact 
on profitability (Haynes, Thompson, & Wright, 2002). On the other hand, Chakravarthy (1984) 
criticized the notion of “divesting “dog” businesses” according to portfolio planning and life cycle 
models in strategic management.  
Alternative theory areas. While issues of “divestiture” and “divestment” are clearly linked to the 
concept of exnovation, they are not the same. However, lack of clarification makes it difficult to draw 
lines between the terms, and – perhaps more important – to build theories around what is decidedly a 
salient issue. The same hold for terms such as “unlearning” and “abandonment” – to which we shall 
return in more detail. Roman and Ash use the term “deadopting” about low-value care in hospitals 
(2014). Smeds et al refer to «vaccuum cleaning» and the need to sweep away “the dust of tradition” 
(1994). Several authors use the heftier term “cannibalization” and the need to “cannibalize” existing 
product lines and production systems (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Conner, 1988; Kerin, Harvey, & Rothe, 
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1978; Landis, 2013; Merunka, 2010; Nijssen, Hillebrand, & Vermeulen, 2005) – given the chance that 
new products will be “chipping away at their existing market share” (Landis, 2013).  
Far beyond what we have referenced her, authors deal with exnovation issues, or issues that are 
closely linked to exnovation problems, using a diverse vocabulary, where diversity of wording itself 
becomes a barrier to theoretical progress. Do we really need separate theories for dealing with issues of 
“vacuum-cleaning” as opposed to issues of “cannibalization”, “divestiture” or “abandonment”? It seems 
to us that time is ripe for developing unified research approaches and an over-arching vocabulary. 
The Semasiological Issue 
The semasiological question starts with a word and asks what it means or what concepts the 
word refers to – why one meaning of the word should be preferred over alternatives. Our semasiological 
issue in relation to exnovation asks why some authors use the word exnovation when referring to 
phenomena quite dis-similar to what Kimberly had in mind.  
Semasiological issues are typically settled by dictionary experts, often offering alternative 
interpretations, and often suggesting the most basic meaning. In the case of exnovation, none of the main 
international dictionaries even mention the concept. Also, Wikipedia for a long time was silent, and a 
recent entry offered a rather superficial definition and a faulty historical account. As of October 2018, 
the page was up-dated, and the following definition was offered: “Exnovation, the opposite of 
innovation, is where processes and practices that have been tested and confirmed are no longer effective 
or no longer fit with strategy and are therefore removed by organizations”.  Ford Motor Company and 
American Airlines are mentioned as “companies that have followed exnovation as a strategy to improve 
organizational performance”, and the entry notes that the “term was coined in the year 1981 by John 
Kimberly”, and that it has since then “proceeded to become a notable parlance in various practices, from 
management to medicine”.  This definition states that an exnovation is the “opposite” of innovation, but 
does not otherwise link exnovation to innovation, neither to phasing out a previous innovation, nor to 
making room for a new innovation. In this sense, the Wikipedia definition – while infinitely better than 
the former entry – is one among a variety of definitions floating around. A similar perception is offered 
by David (2018) in the online Oxford Handbook of Energy and Society, where exnovation is defined as 
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the opposite of innovation – in this case the divestment from fossil-fuel energy. We do not quite see why 
there is a need to talk about exnovation in cases where the main issue is plainly divestment. For us the 
overriding exnovation-issue is the need to create space for a new innovation.  
More competition. Similarly to the case of onomasiology, semasiology involves a form of 
competition, where different meanings are competing for being a prime link to a concept, or for offering 
a prime understanding of a concept. When different authors use the concept exnovation, but evidently 
have quite different meanings in mind, what is the meaning that best exemplifies exnovation? Is it 
Kimberly’s original definition, or is it rather some other kind of competing interpretation? 
In a comment to Roman and Asch (2014) Kimberly writes about the “exnovation conundrum”, 
and he characterizes Roman and Asch’s examples of physicians’ failure to stop old treatments, even 
when there is compelling evidence that the treatments do not work well, as an example of the conundrum 
– which he also sees as a universal phenomenon. Reasons for the intricate problem of exnovation are 
traced to a general problem of getting people to change. Habits and routines become ingrained, often at 
a subconscious level, leading to a “locked in” situation. The irony, for Kimberly, is that while innovation 
is becoming ever more of a catch word, causing what he calls a “pro-innovation bias”, and while most 
scholars writing on the subject have “fallen into the trap of worshipping at innovation’s altar” (2014, p. 
2), innovation frequently fails at the implementation phase, because of lack of exnovation – because 
what needs to be removed, is not removed. The “pro-innovation bias” seems to go hand-in-hand with 
an “anti-exnovation bias”.  
An over-riding purpose. One of the ear-marks in Kimberly’s original definition was that 
exnovation was specifically about removing earlier innovations, as a stage in an innovation cycle. It 
seems, however, that most authors who use the term exnovation essentially as meant by Kimberly, avoid 
his initial narrow linkage to a perceived innovation life cycle. In an article about the need for innovation 
in emerging markets (rather than just imitation of the West), exnovation was seen as a general “dumping 
of obsolete activities” (Khandwalla, 2006).  
Further away from Kimberly’s definition are applications that tend to make exnovation a special 
form of innovation, such as “a backward discovery” form of reversed engineering (Steenhuis & De Boer, 
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1998); or bringing to the surface qualities that are already present in the organization, but that tend to be 
overlooked by both managers and innovators  (Mesman, 2008); or  “innovation from within”, where 
innovation is generated from regular practice by regular (non-inventor) practitioners (Hayes, Batalden, 
& Goldman, 2015; Ledema, 2015); or “innovation from the outside”, based on ideas from customers or 
other outsiders to the organization (Geffroy, 2007).  
Clearly, as noted earlier we are not only facing an onomasiological challenge, but also a 
semasiological challenge. Different meanings are competing for the right to be represented by the 
concept of exnovation. The semasiological solution seems to require a re-birth and an up-dating of 
Kimberly’s original definition. We suggest that making space for new innovation(s) should be the over-
riding purpose of all exnovation activities.   
Failures to Break Through 
Basic to all scientific progress, regardless of discipline, is a minimum of agreement about 
vocabulary. Such agreement may come as a result of an onomasiological “game” or “competition” 
among scientists, because coining a term or a variable plays an important part in theory-building and 
paradigm-making – and also in building scientific authority. Stinchcombe (2002) has suggested that 
theory development in the social sciences presupposes three mechanisms, commensuration, 
evangelization, and truth telling.  
Commensuration. Commensuration implies a standardization of vocabulary. From what we 
have seen, there is today no such standardized vocabulary in the area of exnovation. The word is clearly 
linked to innovation, however. To innovate comes from the Latin, innovare, which (according to 
Webster’s New World Dictionary) means to renew, from in-  and novare, which means to alter or make 
new, from novus. The ex in exnovation, is from both Latin and Greek, where ex generally means “out”, 
as also “out of”, or “free of”, or ”taken out of”.  
Used as a prefix, ex- can mean several things (citing Webster), including “away from”, “out of”, 
pointing to the “taking out” of the whole or a part of an old innovation in order to take in a new 
innovation. In this sense, the word exnovation seem to be a good choice of a word. 
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Evangelization. The point of evangelization is to gain support for giving preference to one 
concept over another – be it for reasons of rhyme, onomatopoeia (phonetically imitating the source), 
shared roots, shared syllables, or whatever might gain support. Whatever the influences, proponents of 
a particular terminology will seek to influence others in the field, spreading their ideas, convictions and 
vocabulary, seeking to convert other researchers to their own views – by writing scholarly articles and 
books, lecturing, and making key-note speeches.  
In the case of exnovation, there is clearly a semantic connection between the words innovation 
and exnovation, but for unknown reasons there has been little effort going on in support of the word.  
Truth telling. Finally, academic institutions come up with institutional arrangements of research 
for the aim of adjudicating among theories, such as having peer reviews of journal articles and public 
defenses of doctoral dissertations. Given the lack of adequate vocabulary and very sparse evangelization, 
it is no surprise that there is little truth telling when it comes to exnovation.  
In the case of exnovation, there in fact seems to have been failures at all three levels, or all three 
mechanisms suggested by Stinchcombe (2002). If there is no viable exnovation concept, students and 
researchers may not feel encouraged to contribute to theory development in corresponding problem 
areas. Neither will there be much hope for truth examination, unless there is some agreement about the 
concept itself and about the phenomenon denoted by the concept.   
We have identified a multitude of terms that have been applied for the “phasing out” 
phenomenon in organizations. Some of these are specifically for the phasing out of former solutions and 
practices in order to make room for new innovations, which se see as the essence of exnovation. We 
have, however, also found it useful to expand on Kimberly’s definition  of exnovation as “divestment 
of previously adopted innovations”,  to the phasing out of whatever investment, arrangement and routine 
that has to be removed in order to provide space for the new innovation.  
TOWARDS REBIRTH AND REDEFINITION 
Kimberly’s main concern was the need to phase out or discard former innovations that were 
blocking the adoption of new innovations. The overriding purpose of exnovation, then, is to make space 
for new innovations.  In our view, however, his definition includes two limiting assumptions:  1) the 
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stuff to be removed or discarded is limited to a former innovation, and 2) exnovation can be seen as a 
more or less predetermined stage in an innovation cycle. 
In the following sections, we shall first argue against these two limiting assumptions. We shall 
first briefly consider the exnovation content part of the definition (removing specific former innovation 
versus broadly making space), and thereafter the process stages element.  We build on the assumption 
that the need for exnovation applies to all forms of innovation (managerial and other, as implicitly 
suggested in the later writing by Kimberly, 2014), and that the overriding purpose of exnovation is to 
create space for new innovations. This also means that there is a need for a redefinition. Without a re-
definition, we see little hope for a rebirth. 
Also, before introducing our set of innovation and exnovation definitions, we shall draw the 
main lines of demarcation between the concept of exnovation and two of the closest concepts  -  those 
of unlearning and abandonment.  Among the (onomasiologically) competing terms, these are perhaps 
the most important challengers, both representing a rich and professional literature about “phasing out” 
or “letting go” phenomena.  However, we are going to argue that in order to make space for new 
innovations, the unlearning concept is too broad, and requires an explicit narrowing towards an 
exnovation purpose, while abandonment is similarly too broad (abandoning for whatever purpose) but 
also too narrow, involving only removal of something (related to what we shall call “removal 
exnovations”) and not modifications, reinterpretations, adaptations, and local changes (related to what 
we shall call “modification exnovations”).  
Beyond Former Innovations 
Kimberly seemed to assume in his early writings that the concept of exnovation only should 
apply to the removal of specific former innovations - apparently, not to other barriers to implementation 
of new innovations.  We may ask, however, whether this is a useful delimitation.   
It may be argued that as long as the purpose of exnovation is to be the provision of space for a 
new innovation, exnovation may denote anything that needs to be changed or removed in order to create 
such space.   
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The content issue.  In order to make space for a new innovation, not only former innovations, 
but also of artefacts, rule books, policies, principles, routines, strategies, mission statements, 
technological paradigms, administrative solutions, and associated cognitions and emotions, may need 
to be changed or removed.  
There are also theoretical and practical reasons for freeing ourselves from only exnovating 
former innovations.  Organizational knowledge comes in many forms, including documents, systems, 
procedures and human knowledge. This also applies to knowledge associated with former innovations.  
Former innovations may have spread and “disappeared” (Yin, 1979) into different parts of the 
organization in the form of practices and routines, and they may not always be easy to identify as former 
innovations.   
Bundles of innovation. Furthermore, different “old” innovations may also be bundled together 
(Ax & Bjørnenak, 2005; Eisenberg et al., 1989), making it difficult to specify exactly which innovation 
is to be exnovated.  Similarly, Potts (2010) emphasizes that “creating space for innovation is hard”, 
because it may “..disconnect from past decisions and knowledge” (p.143). Except for “substitution 
innovations”, where a new innovation specifically replaces a former one, this disconnection issue cannot 
be solved only by “letting go” of specific obsolete or detrimental innovations. 
Removals or modifications. As applied here, the concept of exnovation contains both removals 
and modifications of whatever represent barriers to new innovations.  Without using the word 
exnovation, Canato et al. (2013) demonstrated in their study of 3M, that adoption and implementation 
of a radical innovation (“Six Sigma”) was not all about the full removal, or the full getting rid of ideas, 
practices and artifacts (here termed “removal exnovation”) but also about reinterpretations, 
modifications, adaptations and local changes (here termed “modification exnovation”).  This suggests a 
complexity requiring both a need to go beyond former innovations and a need to open up for varieties 
of exnovation work and varieties of exnovation processes.  
Beyond Stages and Life Cycle Assumptions 
Life cycle assumptions about innovations, as of many other social and natural phenomena, are 
relevant in the sense that innovation processes tend to have a beginning and an end, and something in 
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between such as adoption, implementation and routinization.  This does not mean, however, that any 
type of innovation process can be seen as a smooth, linear, “stage gate” progression.   
Similar to other organizational processes, traditionally assumed to be targeted, planned and 
linear, innovation processes - and in particular processes behind radical innovations - have been found 
to be interactive, dynamic and non-linear.  
The process issue. Van de Ven et al. (1999) applied the notion of an “innovation journey”, 
having compared longitudinal case histories on the development of fourteen innovations.  The authors 
found that none of the innovations developed in a simple linear sequence of activities over time. 
“Instead, a much messier and more complex progression of events was observed in the development of 
each innovation” (p. 23). Van de Ven and his colleagues called this progression of events “the innovation 
journey”. In parallel to this, we suggest thinking of exnovation in “journey” terms.  
This shift of perspective parallels similar changes in the neighboring area of strategic 
management (Earle-Chaffe, 1985; Mintzberg, 1995) emphasizing emergence over planning  -  and it 
also reflects more generally a turn towards assumptions about complexity and complex adaptive systems 
(Stacey, 1995; Stacey, Griffin, & Shaw, 2000; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986; Westerman, 
McFarlan, & Iansiti, 2006).   
Exnovation complexity. Faced with the real-life complexities of innovation processes (Carlisle 
& McMillan, 2006), and with exception for minor incremental processes, we shall suggest a decoupling 
of exnovation processes from the assumption of a more or less linear innovation life cycle. In terms of 
complexity, it can even be argued that “the dynamics of exnovation are much more complex than the 
dynamics of adoption”  -  which may be a reason why “calls for theorizing and research in this area still 
remain unheaded” (Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 1999, p. 380).  
Adding to such complexity is the relationship between exnovation issues and issues of identity 
and emotions. This was demonstrated in the 3M case by Canato et al (2013). In addition to revealing the 
need for both elimination and modification, the authors also show the importance of “compatibility as 
an attribute” (Rogers, 2003).  They noted that in the 3M case, those content elements of the innovation 
(“Six Sigma”), that were experienced as “incompatible with core values of the organization”, were 
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eventually removed or modified -  implying that a “translation” (Roevik, 2016) of the innovation was 
an important part of the innovation process.   
During “translation” of the innovation in the innovation process, values and principles of the 
organization had to be changed (removed or modified) during the exnovation process, requiring a 
“mutual adaptation” activity (Leonard-Barton, 1988) between the innovation and the exnovation 
process, where content elements from both the innovation and the adoption unit (the organization) may 
need modification.  
Before settling for a re-definition of exnovation, we shall briefly examine the two rivalling 
concepts of unlearning and abandonment. In many cases, unlearning and abandonment are at the heart 
of exnovation, and both genres of literature can be highly useful for exnovation research, but we shall 
argue that they are not the same, and that they cannot be substituted for the term exnovation.  
Beyond Unlearning 
Unlearning abound with definitions, and the concept has for a long time served as an umbrella 
concept for the “phasing out” phenomenon, whether such phasing out is due to inefficiency of prevailing 
practices or to a need to adapt to new contingencies, and whether we talk about “forgetting”, 
“discarding”, or “setting aside” obsolete knowledge or behavior.  Therefore, in terms of purpose, 
unlearning is similar to, but not identical to exnovation.   
While exnovation is about the phasing out of something in order to make room for innovation, 
unlearning is about the phasing out of knowledge, skills or behavior for a wide set of purposes, not 
necessarily linked to implementation of new innovations.  In this sense, we may say that exnovation is 
a special case of unlearning.  
Clarity of purpose. To be specific about purpose is important not only on definitional grounds, 
but also in practical terms since clarity about purpose motivates people through meaning, not fear - 
“allowing people to understand the immediate need for change rather than feeling alienated by change 
that is imposed upon them” (EY BeaconInstitute, 2015, p. 3).  
Clarity of purpose is also an important factor in the drive for overall impact (Craig & Snook, 
2014) – issues to which we shall return in the concluding parts of this paper  
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Unlearning and innovation. Research results in the area of unlearning may inform research 
and practice of exnovation.  For instance, Mieres et al. (2012, p. 417) found that  ”.. the greater the level 
of organizational unlearning, the greater the intensity of innovation within the firm”.  Furthermore, Yang 
et al. (2014) distinguished between the “change” and “forgetting” dimensions of unlearning, and 
identified a positive effect upon radical innovation by change (where internal stakeholders were most 
strongly affected), and a negative effect upon radical innovation by forgetting (where also external 
stakeholders were affected, perceiving the implications of memory loss in the focal firm). These and 
other studies suggest that different “types” of unlearning (Coombs, Hislop, Holland, Bosley, & Manful, 
2013) may vary with respect to providing space for innovation, and possibly “foster” and even “drive” 
innovation (Rebernik & Sirec, 2007). 
Beyond Abandonment 
Like unlearning, abandonment is closely linked to exnovation - similar, but not equal.  
We have already noted that, with respect to purpose, the concept of unlearning is too broad. The same 
seems to hold for the abandonment literature – though it is also in some sense too narrow.  
While focusing mainly on how strategies come to be abandoned or phased out, and whether this 
is a result of an internal efficiency calculus or a tendency to “contagion” – following industry trends 
(Greve, 1995, 1998; Oliver, 1992; Younkin, 2016), abandonment may also apply to getting rid of 
organizational practices, existing products or services, and technology solutions in business (Eisenberg 
et al., 1989) or in the military (Rosen, 1988).  
 Causality at the forefront. Thus, the main focus in abandonment is on causal factors behind 
the abandonment of strategies and other practices, not on the specific purpose of making space for new 
innovations (although such considerations may sometimes be included in the abandonment decision).  
In this sense, the abandonment literature is too broad, since a wide array of purposes may be 
behind the decision to abandon. At the same time the term is also too narrow, including only cases of 
elimination of existing practices – not modifications. 
Elimination or modification. The main thing in abandonment is that something has to be 
removed (or completely eliminated). In the case of exnovation, however, we shall need to include more 
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broadly what it takes to make room for innovations, including cases where things need to be modified – 
not necessarily abandoned or eliminated (Canato et al., 2013).  
We have seen that both unlearning and abandonment are closely linked to exnovation, and they 
provide rich sources of research inputs. But neither are the two terms identical (so that they cannot both 
be identical to exnovation, or make the term exnovation superfluous), nor do any of them fulfill the need 
for a concept of exnovation specifically targeted to purpose (make space for new innovations) 
Defining Innovation and Exnovation 
The concept, and the practice of innovation have received ever increasing interest in both 
business and public domains over the last fifty years. Innovation is at the heart of intellectual capital 
management, and intellectual capital is at the heart of modern value creation (Blackler, 1995; Grant, 
2002; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1993).  
Stockholder demands for growth and profit, and community demand for jobs, necessitate high 
levels of innovation and new product development, facilitated in many cases by customer inputs and 
open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007; Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & 
West, 2006; von Hippel, 1981, 1988) and increasingly by digitalized markets for inventions (Nambisan 
& Sawhney, 2008, 2009). For these reasons, and given that we perceive exnovation to be in many cases 
mandatory for innovation success, it seems natural to link our definition of exnovation to a definition of 
innovation. We shall do so through a three step process, first anchoring a definition of innovation, then 
adding a definition of an innovation process that is aligned with the definition of innovation, and finally 
adding definitions of both exnovation and the exnovation process, that are both aligned with the 
corresponding innovation definitions.  
A definitional anchoring point. Given the popularity of innovation and innovation research 
(the “pro-innovation bias”), one might hope that researchers and practitioners would agree upon a shared 
definition of the word innovation.  Unfortunately, that has not been the case. Dozens of definitions of 
the term innovation exist and are used side by side. In particular, there seems often to be a mix-up of the 
terms innovation and innovation process. While content involves ”what” issues, process involves “how” 
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issues, suggesting ways in which innovation come about, while also accounting for the dynamics 
surrounding innovation development and implementation. 
As an anchoring point, we shall go for a traditional content definition (Zaltman et al., 1973, p. 
10), that states that an innovation is “any idea, practice, or material artifact perceived to be new by the 
relevant unit of adoption”. This definition has the advantage of being well known, specific and practical. 
It is also robust, in the sense that most other definitions of innovation in the innovation literature, are at 
least compatible with it. As we shall see, it also lends itself to alignment with our definition of both 
innovation process, exnovation, and exnovation process. 
Anchoring the process. Going from a content definition to a process definition, there is an 
abundance of studies of innovation processes, but not many attempts at coming up with a robust 
definition. There is also a considerable variety of characteristics of such processes, ranging from pre-
planned, linear models to what Van de Ven & al. described in journey terms as a “much messier and 
more complex progression of events” (1999, p. 23). Also, while the progression of events may be messy, 
one might think that researchers at least would agree about what are the main stages of the process. But 
that is not quite the case.  
At an early study, Myers and Marquis (1969) identified three steps in the innovation process: 
Idea development, problem-solving, and implementation. Van de Ven & al. (1999) identified initiation, 
development, and implementation or termination as common stages across different types of journeys. 
Bessant (2005) has suggested four stages of innovation processes: Searching (for signals, threats, and 
opportunities), selecting (among decision alternatives), implementing (by bringing selected alternative 
into use), and finally learning (from the progression of activities). Many more examples can be found 
from studies of specific areas of innovation. Early examples are Baker, Siegmann, and Rubenstein 
(1967), who identified stages of R&D processes, and Van de Ven and Koenig’s (1976) study of 
innovation in social services.  
It seems to us that a general definition of innovation processes needs to be sufficiently open with 
respect to the specific stages or steps taken, in order to account for both the general messiness of the 
process, for the huge variety of contexts, including recent digital innovation processes  (Nylen, 2015; 
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Nylen & Homstrom, 2015) and for different types of innovation (such as radical versus incremental, 
modular versus architectural, and singular innovations versus innovation streams).  
At bottom, and behind the messiness issue, there at least needs to be a clear understanding of 
the word process, and also in our opinion an alignment with the content definition of innovation. Bessant 
(2005) suggested that the innovation process “involves a series of linked activities” (p.35). In more 
elaborate terms, Pettigrew (1997, p. 338) defined the process as a “sequence of individual and collective 
events, actions, and activities unfolding over time in a context”. Building from process characteristics 
and from our “anchoring” of an innovation content definition, we suggest that an innovation process can 
be defined as a sequence of linked events, actions and activities undertaken for the purpose of 
implementing and making use of any idea, practice, or material artifact perceived to be new by a relevant 
unit of adoption. Please see table 1 for an overview of definitions.  
Parallel definitions. In parallel to the Zaltman et al. (1973) content definition of innovation, we 
will suggest that a content definition of exnovation is any idea, practice, or material artifact in the 
adoption unit that needs to be removed or modified in order to make room for new innovation(s). The 
words “removed or modified” reflect several considerations. First, as already mentioned, we do not see 
exnovation as the opposite of innovation, nor as a specific form of innovation. Neither do we see 
exnovation as necessarily a specific, closing stage of a former innovation. Our basic assumption is that 
in order to succeed with a new innovation, some “stuff” (ideas, practices, artifacts) may have to be 
removed or at least modified in order to make room for the new. This all add up to a high level of 
complexity of exnovation processes. 
 To summarize, we suggest that an exnovation process may be defined as a sequence of 
linked events, actions and activities undertaken in order to remove or modify ideas, practices, or material 
artifacts for the purpose of making room for new innovation(s).  
Phenomenological definitions of innovation and exnovation.  There are many different 
conceptualizations of the innovation phenomenon.  A typical dictionary definition would be that 
innovation is about the introduction of something new - a new idea, a new method, process, tool, or 
device.  When practitioners, entrepreneurs, politicians or social scientists refer to innovation, it is 
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frequently in such general terms. They talk about “levels of innovation” or about “need for innovation” 
- in the company, city, or country - or about innovation pressure, innovation intensity, new areas of 
innovation, or about innovations that have succeeded or failed.   
Table 1: Three parallel definitions 
 
                         Object 
Definition types 
Innovation Exnovation 
Content definition An innovation is ”any idea, 
practice, or material artefact 
perceived to be new by the 
relevant unit of adoption”*  
An exnovation is any idea, 
practice, or material artifact in 
the adoption unit that needs to 
be removed or modified in order 
to make room for new 
innovation(s) 
Process definition An innovation process is a 
sequence of linked events, 
actions and activities 
undertaken for the purpose of 
implementing and making use 
of an idea, practice, or material 
artifact perceived to be new by 
a relevant unit of adoption** 
An exnovation process is a 
sequence of linked events, 
actions and activities 
undertaken in order to remove 
or modify ideas, practices, or 
material artifacts for the 
purpose of making room for 
new innovation(s)  
 
Phenomenological definition Innovation means that 
something new appears and is 
put to use 
Exnovation means that 
something is being removed or 
modified in order to allow space 
for new innovation(s) 
 
 * The content definition of innovation is a citation from Zaltman, G., Duncan, R. B., & Holbek, J. (1973). 
Innovation in Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons, p. 10. 
** For the process definition of innovation we make reference to Pettigrew, A. (1997). What is a 
processual analysis? Scandinavian Journal of Management, 13(4), 337-348, and  Bessant, J. 
(2005). Enabling Continuous and Discontinous Innovation: Learning from the Private Sector. 
Public Money and Management, 25(1), 35-42.  
 
 
In science, “phenomenology is both a philosophy and a research approach” (Stierand & Dorfler, 
2012, p. 947). Relevant to the content of this paper, innovation can be treated as a nebulous phenomenon 
and concept, but often with important implications for understanding and research.  While 
phenomenological studies of innovation and exnovation is outside the scope of the present review, it is 
important to keep in mind that phenomenology has often been a central component in innovation and 
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(we suggest) exnovation processes  -  in opening and closing “new windows” (Menon, 2006). We shall 
therefore also include a phenomenological definition of both innovation and exnovation. 
We believe that a more consistent use of vocabulary and definitions among academics may not 
only lead to theory development and systematic empirical research, but also to a more consistent 
language use among practitioners and professionals. We also believe that in order to succeed with 
innovation, exnovation is needed, and that the need for exnovation, and for new exnovation tools and 
instruments, are more likely to be acted upon when we have clear definitions and consistent use of terms.  
It is now time to focus more directly on problem issues of exnovation. Overall, we see barriers 
to exnovation as parts of a greater organizational inertia issue, raising both macro-level structural issues 
(cf. Rumelt, 1995) and micro-level (cf. Felin, Foss, & Ployhart, 2015) cognitive and emotional bias 
issues. In the present paper, while not discarding structural aspect, we deal mainly with micro level 
issues. We shall first present an economical model of exnovation rationality and the issue of historical 
investments, before turning to cognitive biases and emotional influences that may impact exnovation 
decisions and practices. Finally, we shall suggest some areas for future discourse, research and practises 
related to exnovation. 
OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO EXNOVATION 
We have defined an exnovation as an idea, practice, or material artifact that needs to be removed 
or significantly modified in order to provide space for a new innovation, and we have defined an 
exnovation process as the process of removing or modifying ideas, practices, or material artefacts for 
the same purpose. We now need to consider why exnovation, so simple and logical in principle, 
sometimes turns out to be so challenging in practice. 
We shall first consider an important principle for judging about the economic aspects of the 
exnovation decision, introducing the sunk cost criterion. From the “default” case of sunk cost 
economics, we shall turn to the cognitive and emotional reasons for biased decision-making and to ways 
of overcoming such biases. We shall also note that local experience and strong organizational identities 
may magnify the problems of biases and inertia.  
19 
 
The default case of economic rationality 
When people base investment or divestment decisions on sunk cost considerations, they are said 
to be committing the “sunk cost fallacy”.  People commit this fallacy quite frequently due to a variety 
of human cognitive and emotional biases. The fallacy leads to what has been termed the “sunk cost 
effect”, defined as “..the tendency to consider prior costs as facilitative of future commitments” (Leahy, 
2000, p. 356).  It is recognized that deciding against the sunk cost criterion and committing to the sunk 
cost fallacy may be major barriers to innovation (Pierce, 2002) as well as exnovation and abandonment. 
However, the decision to adopt an innovation, and to exnovate accordingly, is not just a rational 
economic choice. It is often a complex judgmental affair, involving ethical considerations, social and 
environmental concerns, experience attachments, and stakeholder issues. 
Borrowing from the “resistance to change” literature, we are also reminded that an exnovation 
type of change process is not just about making a rational decision, but also about dealing with 
cognitions and cognitive biases, emotions and attachments, routines and behaviors;  it is also about 
handling barriers to implementation rooted in path-dependent competence domains and institutional 
arrangements.  These issues raise an important question: Is the sunk cost criterion a general criterion 
(“history does not count”), or is it a conditional criterion (“history matters under some conditions”)?  
We will take a closer look at this question. 
History does not count.  Superimposed on the complexities of technical and managerial 
judgments is the rational, economic principle of sunk cost as a default model of exnovation economics.  
This classic economic principle or criterion applies to all cases of decision making, where some form of 
investment cost, made in the past, cannot be recovered or reversed.  In general terms, this economic man 
ideal suggests that managers act rationally when deciding to exnovate any existing idea, practice, and 
artifact that stand in the way of introducing a new innovation. The principle says: “let decisions of the 
past go”  -  “disregard sunk costs” and bring only prospective costs and benefits into the equation. 
A prospective cost is a future cost that will be incurred or altered depending on present decisions 
and future action. Even as the principle of sunk cost is generally quite clear and easy to comprehend, 
research in the behavioral sciences documents that the “sunk cost fallacy” of counting in former 
investments is indeed quite common - both in everyday life and in managerial work. A frequently used 
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example is that people who have bought a movie ticket, may feel they have to go and see the movie 
“since we already have bought the ticket”, even if they would rather do something else that evening. A 
more high-level case would be that President George W. Bush in 2005 justified continued war in Iraq 
by claiming that the nation owed it to those who had given their lives in the war. At the managerial 
levels, “The Concorde fallacy” is about the continuation of investments in the Concorde aircraft project 
long after both French and British officials understood that the project would not be sustainable (Arkes 
& Ayton, 1999). The three examples demonstrate how tempting it is to commit the “sunk cost fallacy”, 
and become involved in the irrational tendency to escalate commitment and willingly invest additional 
resources in areas of previous investments (Staw, 1976).   
On the other hand, Mcaffe et al (2010) have suggested that the consideration of sunk costs may 
not always be a fallacy. In a broad range of situations, previous experience may present informational 
content, reputational benefits, loyalties and expertise that may make it rational to take sunk cost into 
consideration - contrary to the economic advice.  Teams and organizations, investors and stakeholders 
may not be willing or able to mobilize for a new project if they already have worked hard for a project 
that is terminated. Does it mean that the principle of sunk cost is itself a fallacy? 
We agree that such “moderating” elements of experience should be part of the exnovation decision, but 
only when they influence the evaluation of prospective costs and benefits. If loss of prestige or loyalty 
from scrapping a project, will make a new innovation investment less profitable, this belongs to the 
estimation of prospective costs and benefits.  Such issues should be taken into consideration, not because 
of the investments or sacrifices that have been made in the past, but because they may subvert the 
prospect for new innovation success. 
History counts.  While the whole issue of market level path dependencies is still unsettled 
(Hirsch & Gillespie, 2012; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990, 1995) and of little relevance to our topic, the 
organizational path dependency phenomenon has deservedly received increasing attention in the 
management and organization literature. Vergne and Durand (2010) have defined path dependence as 
“a property of a stochastic process which obtains under two conditions (contingency and self-
reinforcement) and causes lock-in in the absence of exogenous shock” (p. 737). 
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While the market mechanism ensures efficiency by allowing for “exogenous shocks” and 
disruptions to occur, our interest here is in how such shocks and disruptions, as well as internal sources 
of innovation, produce exnovation challenges to firms more or less deeply entrenched in a path, even to 
the extent of being “locked-in”.  Internally, firms will benefit from periods of prolonged rationalization, 
competence building, network and cluster formation, and there will be self-reinforcing elements 
intensifying adherences to a path. But events that may cause creative destruction and efficient clearances 
at the market level, at the same time also create crises and exnovation urgencies in incumbent firms.  
Thus, path dependence may become a trap - of greater interest to organization researchers than 
to economists. The sunk cost principle tells us that historical investments should not be part of the 
decision of what to do next. History does not matter!  Only prospective costs and benefits should enter 
the calculus.  Path dependence theory tells us that history matters. History has brought about specialized 
competence, taylor-made structures and infrastructures, employee loyalties, economies of scale, unique 
business connections, efficient routines and behaviors, and organizational identity. The potential 
sacrifice of such path-dependent values needs to be considered, and should influence decisions during 
the exnovation journey - not because of what they have meant in the past, but because they will impact 
the prospective costs and benefits of a new innovation.  Such decisions are colored by cognitions and 
cognitive distortions, by emotions and attachments. 
Cognition and Emotion  
When studying barriers to exnovation, we are seeking to understand the anti-exnovation bias 
commonly found in organizations.  This bias is important because it hampers the introduction of new 
innovation, and may ultimately be a major source of firm heterogeneity and competitive disadvantage - 
especially in the cases of radical innovations in incumbent firms. Similar biases in decision-making are 
often mainly studied within a cognitive framework. We strongly believe, however, that emotional 
perspectives need to be added in order to gain a more robust perspective. 
Similar bias-issues are also raised in the unlearning and abandonment literature, where cognitive 
perspectives traditionally have been dominating. In particular, an increasing number of abandonment 
studies are now reminding us to pay attention to emotional barriers to innovation - even to the point of 
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considering abandonment as a “death” event, suggesting transition rituals and “funerals” as a solution 
(Albert, 1984; Sutton, 1987).  
We shall start with cognitive deviations. Cognitive biases may enter into the exnovation 
decisions in several forms, that may all add to our understanding of why managers fail to exnovate or 
why they end up with ineffective exnovation efforts.  
Cognitive biases and distortions. In our dealings with exnovation type phenomena, we expect 
most managers to use common sense, and some managers to use more sophisticated, formal analyses. 
Common sense is a distinctly human capacity, and is based on our everyday cognitive ability to 
understand situations (“read” people and situations), and respond sensibly to problems and challenges 
(Watts, 2011). However, even when not influenced by provocative emotions, people tend to limit their 
search for relevant information (Simon, 1947). Executives may be trapped by faulty “pattern 
recognition” and “emotional tags” (Campbell, Whitehead, & Finkelstein, 2009). And we may all distort 
facts, get the statistics wrong, do superficial judgments, and make biased decisions (Fine, 2006; Kida, 
2006; Plous, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981, 1986). People claim to base their decisions on 
experience, even when they have very little relevant experience, and we often make decisions based on 
very scant information.  
More specifically, the psychology of “framing effects” can explain why managers may 
experience “loss aversion” when exnovating old practices and material artefacts. We tend to see a 
possible loss as more significant than an equivalent gain, and we tend to prefer a certain gain (“the 
certainty effect”) over a probabilistic gain (Druckman, 2001; Plous, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
We also tend to frame positively, and overestimate, the benefits of existing assets – which may be bad 
news for exnovation. In particular, such biases may be more serious for people with a personal 
responsibility for the former solution, who generally may exert more willingness to continue investing 
in the present (old) solution (Staw & Fox, 1977) - indicating a sunk cost fallacy as a result of personal 
responsibility, and resulting in an “escalation of commitment” at work (Whyte, 1986).  
Blindness to bias. A particular problem with cognitive distortions and biases, is that we tend to 
be blind to our own biases: We are too blind to see our own blindness (Kahneman, 2011). Strong 
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conviction often built up gradually, with increasing commitment over time, reinforced by publicly 
stating one’s convicitons and by the prestige stemming from successes associated with those 
convictions. When our convictions are challenged by new information, there will be a tendency for 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956; Knox & Inkster, 1968). 
A particular “trap” in cognitive dissonance is the “fallacy of centrality” (Westrun, 1993). Managers and 
experts who believe they are in the middle of things, where the level of expertise is highest, tend to have 
more problems giving up their convictions, and they are more prone to reject contradictory information.  
There will also be “confirmation biases” (Kida, 2006; Nickerson, 1998; Plous, 1993). We tend 
to search for information that confirm our own convictions, and we tend to interpret new information 
and recall old information in ways that are consistent with previous convictions – a tendency that even 
seems to hold for scientific work (Koehler, 1993; Maccoun, 1998; Mahoney, 1977).  
Cognitions and emotions combined. We suggest that emotional responses play a significant 
part in exnovation decisions and that emotions are particularly essential in understanding identity and 
attachment issues. While we here deal with both cognitive and emotional issues, this does not mean that 
we accept the traditional mind-body, cognition-emotion dualism. Brain research and advances in 
neuroscience has given ample proof that “pure thinking” – separated from emotional impulses – is 
illusory (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; Damasio, 1994). Whether we deal with everyday 
problem-solving or pure mathematics, bodily anchored emotions will be present and add sensations 
about being on the right track, or about failing, getting frustrated or satisfied. All our examples of 
cognitive biases hinge on emotional influences that are inherent to the way the human brain works.  
Our concern is with the common tendency for management researchers to neglect the emotional 
aspects. In their treatise of change in organizations, the Heath brothers, Chips and Dan (2010) portrays 
the relationship between cognitions and emotions in management as a relationship between an elephant 
and driver un top of the elephant. The elephant goes where he likes to go – steered by emotions. The 
driver – guided by rational thinking – may know where he wants to take the elephant, but that is not 
enough. He needs to find ways to motivate and let the elephant “be moved” to go. Here the issue is not 
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to teach an elephant organization how to tap-dance, but to appeal to the emotion-elephants in individuals 
and groups in the organization. 
Parallel systems of processing. Beyond the mere distinction between cognition and emotion, 
modern neuroscience also points to two parallel systems of cognitive processing. The reflexive system 
– linked to “Type 1” decisions (Larrick, 2004) – is to a great extent automatic and implicit, anchored in 
the limbic parts of brain evolution, tied to emotion, motivation and behavior, and strongly influenced by 
senses and memories. It can also be extremely fast. The reflective system – linked to “Type 2” decisions, 
on the other hand, is to a much greater extent deliberate and controlled, anchored in evolutionary late-
comer parts of the brain, and being supportive of higher forms of cognition such as logical reasoning 
and planning (Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). It can also be 
exceedingly slow. 
While the “hot” reflexive system is much more affect-bound than the “cold” reflective system, 
both systems in fact build on both cognition and emotion. One cannot turn off the emotional part of 
thinking, even when engaging in reflection. Accordingly, it is important to understand the role of each 
part in managerial judgment and decision-making. 
Calls for greater effort. There is a tendency to think of “cold” cognition as basic to rational 
decision-making and behavior, and to think of biased thinking as a result of “warm” or “soft” emotional 
impacts. According to Hodgkinson and Healey (2014) there is also a paradigmatic tendency, in the 
footsteps of Simon (1947) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), to respond to managerial challenges (as 
when the elephant doesn’t move) with calls for harder thinking – more “effortful processing of 
information” that “jolts decision makers into conscious reflection, thereby forcing them to revise their 
beliefs” (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2014, p. 1307). While this may work in some cases, it doesn’t 
necessarily solve the general problem of adapting to the requirements of radical innovations.  
If more effortful thinking, and the call to management and organization members for thinking 
harder, does not work: What does? Hodgkinson and Healey (2014) suggest that both scholars and 
practitioners need to make a paradigmatic shift and accept the need to deal directly with the emotional 
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component – not as a nuisance, or by-pass issue, but as a main issue. Herbert Simon, often considered 
at proponent of “thinking harder” – or at least an excellent analyst of why we don’t think harder, should 
also be remembered for his later call for attention to the emotional aspect: “Hence, in order to have 
anything like a complete theory of human rationality, we have to understand what role emotion play in 
it” (Simon, 1983, p. 29).   
The problem with exnovation-related decisions may not be so much at the “cold” cognitive level 
of limited information processing ability, as at the “warm” level of emotions – one of freeing oneself 
from inappropriate self-interests, distorting attachments to old beliefs and behaviors, and the presence 
of misleading memories. In fact, Campbell, Whitehead and Finkelstein found that in 80 percent of 
flawed decisions in their study of 83 cases, the decision-makers were guided by faulty pattern 
recognition and emotional tagging, and they failed to consider alternative options (Campbell et al., 
2009).  
Local Experiential Attachment  
At the level of journeys, we have noted certain shared characteristics of innovation and 
exnovation. A distinct difference, however, relates to the impact of local experience. When making 
decision about new innovations, only a limited amount of knowledge exists about the innovation to be 
adopted. The exnovation decision, on the other hand, may be strongly influenced by local and long-
lasting, hard-won experiences.  This local experience-difference between new innovations on the one 
hand, and exnovation type “old stuff” on the other, is clearly emphasized in the professional literature.  
Studying adoption and abandonment of matrix management programs (a complex and radical 
innovation), Burns and Wholey (1993) noted that “.. the abandonment decision seems to be based on 
information peculiar to an institution’s direct experience” (p.133). Similarly, studying corporate venture 
capital (CVC) practices in the US, Gaba and Dokko  (2016) found that while abandonment decisions to 
some extent depended  on social learning and influence, “.. a theory of abandonment needs to differ 
from a theory of adoption, because abandonment decisions must also account for firms’ direct 
experience with practice” (p.1559). Such local experience will create emotional “experience 
attachments” (Kleine & Baker, 2004), and have the power of a “deadly momentum” (Miller, 1990).   
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It has been empirically verified that such a preservation momentum imply “..a powerful 
tendency to keep rolling in the same direction” (Miller, 1990, p. 269), in particular when associated with 
past organizational successes. In his review of the literature,  Sayles (1999, p. 65) concludes that 
“..success blinds management to what are critically problematic issues”.  
Experience preservation, due to attachment and commitment, also may lead to inertia and 
potentially lock-ins.  Within a decision making framework, inertia has been defined as a choice to 
maintain the status quo (Polites & Karahanna, 2012), whereas exnovation calls for attempts to 
overcoming such inertia. We have pointed to cognitive and emotional reasons for inertia – while still 
aware that inertia also has been framed in structural terms (Rumelt, 1995).  
Reducing Biases  
We have considered human (cognitive and emotional) biases that act as barriers to exnovation 
and may cause defects in decision making. It is generally acknowledged that human bias is a normal 
operating characteristic of the human brain that can hardly be avoided.  However, human bias in 
organizational settings can be reduced, and the reduction is considered important by practitioners.  
In a survey of nearly 800 board members and chairpersons, Bhagat and Kehoe (2014) found that 
respondents ranked “reducing decision biases” as their number-one aspiration for improving 
performance (See comment by Baer, Helligtag, & Samandari, 2017). Specific examples of such high-
level aspirations, with focus upon broad de-biasing operation, have increasingly emerged in the 
professional literature – such as McKee & Stuckler (2016) on the World Bank, and McKinsey Quarterly 
(2017, in an interview with Bernhard Günther) on the German electric utility RWE.   
Looking for safeguards. Finkelstein et al. (2009) assembled a database of 83 case-decisions 
that they felt were flawed at the time they were made.  From our analysis of these cases, they say, “we 
concluded that flawed decisions start with errors of judgement made by influential individuals” 
(Campbell & Whitehead, 2009). The authors found that errors of judgement and distorted decisions 
occurred due to inappropriate self-interest, misleading memories, and emotional attachments.  Calling 
such distortions “red-flag”-conditions, the authors argue strongly, that managers need to recognize the 
sources and strengths of these biases, and then design safeguards that inject “fresh experience and 
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analysis”, introduce “further debate and challenge”, or impose “stronger governance”.  It appears that 
these safeguards are generic recommendations and methods that depersonalize difficult decisions - not 
leaving pivotal choices in the hands of one or just a few emotion-constrained and bias-hampered 
individuals.  While seeking advice from others is an under-utilized de-biasing technique (Yaniv & 
Milyavsky, 2007), it can help individual decision makers overcome narrow thinking and increase 
decision readiness (Soll, Milkman, & Payne, 2015). 
Soll et al. (2015, p. 924) discuss “..two general approaches available for de-biasing decisions: 
(1) de-biasing by modifying the decision maker (e.g. through  education and the provision of tools) and 
(2) de-biasing by modifying the environment (e.g. by creating optimal conditions for support of wise 
judgments)”.  While some bias-reducing recommendations have the advantage of being characterized 
by simplicity and generic content, much research suggest that the most successful de-biasing methods 
should be domain-specific (Heath, Larrick, & Klayman, 1998; Soll et al., 2015).This may imply 
decision-quality control by means of checklists, with questions of particular relevance to certain types 
of decisions (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011). Such domain-specific tools may 
usefully be added to generic approaches, and in our case tailor-made to exnovation decisions. 
We have earlier in this paper presented some of the most important human biases as related to 
exnovation decisions, and we have emphasized that a major problem with such decisions is the existence 
of cognitive and emotional attachment to what should be removed, and that the most visible 
consequences of this attachment is the sunk-cost fallacy and path dependence biases. Reviewing the 
literature on prescriptive strategies, Larrick (2004) notes that these biases - as well as others - are 
“multiply-determined” and that “..there is unlikely to be a one-to-one mapping of causes”.  Since 
different processes may also be “inter-dependent”,  Larrick (2004, p. 332) recommends a combination 
of approaches: “Together, simplicity and domain-specificity greatly enhance the memorability and 
applicability of the practices, making them more likely to be adopted in practice”.  
Dealing with the complexities of de-biasing. Commenting on the future of debiasing, Larrick 
(2004) first emphasizes the importance of identifying “debiasing techniques for affect-based biases” 
(see also Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015).  Next, Larrick (2004) points to the growing interest 
in “the robustness of intuitive strategies”, asking “when is intuition (Type 1 decisions) sufficiently 
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reliable that intervention is not worthwhile” (p.334).  Of particular relevance to radical innovation and 
exnovation decisions is the question of how a balance can be achieved between “Type 1” decisions (the 
intuitive, reflexive decisions) and “Type 2” decisions (the analytical, reflective decisions).   
It is important to note that researchers in the field of emergency medicine (frequently implying 
radical and fast decision making) have found that expert decision makers blend the two types of systems. 
Helman (2015, p. 2) has summarized the results of research in emergency decision-making: “Experts 
use their experience and past errors/mistakes to reflect on their knowledge and their biases and develop 
heuristics (cognitive short-cuts) and cognitive forcing strategies that allow them to use their Type 1 
system for rapid decision making in EM (emergency medicine) rather than having to slow down using 
their Type 2 system”. We find it reasonable to hypothesize that in an exnovation context this implies a 
need for balancing Type 1 and Type 2 approaches, depending on time-frames, levels of uncertainty and 
availability of relevant data. Where the picture is unclear, and the data do not suggest a clear-cut 
recommendation, even high level decision-makers may base their judgment on a “gut feeling”. 
Exnovation and Identity 
Considering our comments so far about cognitions, biases, emotions and attachments, much of 
what we have called “constraints” can be linked to – and sometimes summarized – in the concept of 
organizational identity. Identity is a powerful concept (Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000; Bouchikhi & 
Kimberley, 2008) “invoked to make sense and explain action” (Gioia, Patvardhan, Hamilton, & Corley, 
2013, p. 125), and it is critical because of its “tremendous potential to motivate and shape (and be shaped 
by) strategic choice and action” (Ashforth & Mael, 1996, p. 20). 
The identity literature is wide and deep, and it is beyond the scope of the present paper to give 
a full review with links to the concept of exnovation. Instead, we shall point out one main issue. 
Traditionally organizational identity expresses what is central or core to the organization’s character or 
self-image (key values, labels, products, services, or practices, etc.), that makes the organization 
distinctive from similar organizations, and that can be viewed as enduring or as having continuity over 
time (Albert & Whetton, 1985; Gioia et al., 2013).  
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Strength or inertia. While a strong identity can generally be considered a source of strength, it 
may also be a source of inertia (Reger, Gustavson, Demarie, & Mullane, 1994; Stimpert, Gustafson, & 
Sarason, 1998) and of resistance to change (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal, & Hunt, 
1998). It may over time even provoke a lock-in relationship between the organization and its 
environment (Burgelman, 2002). Pressures for change may cause members to defend organizational 
identity (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996) and resist innovation and change.  
A more recent approach, however,  portrays organizational identity as a more fluid and unstable 
construct: “There must be fluidity of the notion; otherwise, the organization stagnates in the face of an 
inevitably changing environment” (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000, p. 65). The words “central”, 
“distinctive”, and “continuity” are often called the pillars of identity. It is the combination of these 
characteristics that may create problems in times of change, making renewal difficult.  
Widening, dynamizing and compatibilizing. We may consider three main factors that may 
ease the relationship between identity and renewal, and also between identity and exnovation: 1) 
Widening the mission and relevant strategy areas; 2) Dynamizing the identity of the organization, 
building innovative capacity and exnovation capability explicitly into the central, distinctive and lasting 
elements of identity; and 3) Compatibilizing  by seeking out innovations that are compatible with such 
an identity.   
Widening the mission and the relevant strategy space, is about grading various elements of 
identity, such that more concrete, specific products and services will be considered temporary and 
changeable by members of the organization. On the other hand, more abstract elements are seen as basic 
and lasting (Margolis & Hansen, 2002).  
Dynamizing identity means to build it around a core of innovativeness, change-capacity and 
“exnovativeness”. The discussion of costs and benefits of a strong identity is in this regard similar to the 
discussion of costs and benefits of a strong organization culture. A strong static culture may be a liability 
in times of change, whereas a strong innovative culture –  and an identity built around innovativeness 
and “exnovativeness” – may in fact be a greater benefit the more change and radical innovativeness 
there is in the environment  (Hatum & Pettigrew, 2006; Pratt, 1998; Tripsas, 2009). A good example is 
30 
 
how 3 M Company over consecutive years was an innovation winner, where inventiveness was built 
into the core of the identity.  
Compatibilizing means that managers should seek out innovation areas that are compatible with 
the identity of the organization. Steve Jobs moved Apple from “computers” to “digital products”, a 
revolutionary step in terms of strategy, while the firm still remained basically the same in the eyes of its 
key constituencies. 
We suggest that these three dimensions of an identity-strategy should not be considered 
independently or in isolation, but as an integrated whole. Together they may also provide answers to 
Anthony and Tripsas’s (2016) concerns regarding categories of innovation (identity-enhancing, identity-
stretching, and identity-challenging innovations).  
FUTURE DISCOURSE, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 
Having proposed a redefinition of exnovation and also dealt with some main challenges to 
exnovation management, we shall briefly suggest some areas for exnovation research and practice. We 
would like, however, to add that resistance to exnovation may be entirely rational. We clearly 
sympathize with Piderit’s (2000) call for a focus on ambivalence to change, more than on resistance to 
change.  
We are not saying that there should be more exnovation or less, only that scholars in the field 
need to agree upon a definition and develop theories about the relationship between this phenomenon 
and related phenomena in order to improve research and make theoretical progress, and in order to give 
better practical advice. We are also saying that whether or not more exnovation is desirable, decision-
makers should at least try to steer free of biases. In particular, we suggest that the emotional component 
needs to receive more attention. 
We have suggested, and our definitions presupposes a journey perspective or framework for 
exnovation studies. Van de Ven and his colleagues saw the journey as “highly ambiguous and often 
uncontrollable and unique to its travelers” (1999, p. 21). Van de Ven has recently restated the journey 
perspective of innovation and argued for better maneuvering of the journey (Van de Ven, 2017). We 
suggest that a similar search for better maneuvering of the exnovation journey may be an equally worthy 
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enterprise. Expeditions into the unknown do not proceed randomly, but neither do they proceed in a 
predictable, linear manner.  Both journeys are frequently marked by trial-and-error and learning-by 
doing, and they can perhaps best be studied from a complex adaptive systems perspective (Carlisle & 
McMillan, 2006). And while innovation and exnovation journeys share some characteristics, they 
represent two processes with distinctly different attributes of decision-making and behaviors. Following 
Fiol and O’Conner (2017), the “old” is never fully extinct, and we will argue with these two authors that 
an organization is likely to require “repetitive interaction” between “old” and “new” – in our terms: 
repetitive interaction between the two journeys over time.  
Diagnosis and profile mapping   
Hodgkinson and Healey (2014) suggest specific intervention strategies for dealing with 
emotional resistance and hesitance to change. Such intervention strategies may be framed in exnovation 
terms. Specifically, the authors suggest that “capabilities in diagnosing and acting on emotional signals, 
not suppressing them, thus differentiate dynamic firms from their less responsive counterparts” 
(Hodgkinson & Healey, 2014, p. 1308). A good diagnosis will help organizations “put systems, 
structures and tools in place to enable emotion learning from dissonance” (2014, p. 1308). The authors 
then, building on Manfred, De Vries, & Miller (1984), suggest starting with a mapping of the 
organization’s “adaptive-affective style”. This means to identify – on the one hand – “avoidance 
emotions” and maladaptive “neurotic styles”, automated responses of distrust and “ostricism”, and a 
tendency to seek protection behind rules and regulations. Or – on the other hand – the organization may 
be marked by “openness emotions”, and by routines and incentive systems that favor openness for 
radical innovations. 
Recognizing the salient role of identity, Bouchikhi and Kimberly (2003) devised an «identity 
audit” with a series of cognitively anchored questions, targeted towards the identification of “identity 
traps”. We suggest that more work should go into developing and improving diagnostic tools specifically 
designed for exnovation, following the Rautenbach, Sutherland and Scheepers (2015, p. 161) reasoning 
that: “Once the executives have more insight, a proactive approach towards letting go of harmful 
attachments can be adopted instead of a reactive approach”. Thus, diagnostic tools may be used to 
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identify strategic contradictions linked to innovation transitions; tendencies to “group think” or 
“thinking in the box”; structural and governance-type barriers to exnovation; or identity anchoring to 
too narrow paths – thus informing our avenues for exnovation research and management that follow, 
starting with strategic transitions.  
Installing New Governance for Exnovation 
Beyond the roles of individual “opponents” or “challengers”, structural initiatives to identify 
“red flag” conditions and organize de-biasing arrangements may be taken. Campbell, Whitehead and 
Finkelstein (2009) suggested “governance” and “monitoring” as “safeguards” against attachment and 
identity-caused biases, and they suggest that quite simple measures, such as adding a subcommittee of 
the board, may sometimes do the job.  
As a more lasting solution, we suggest going back to the kinds of adjudication structures 
suggested by Delbecque and Mills (1985) for enhancing innovation capability in organizations, and we 
suggest similar measures for exnovation purposes. Organizations may sometimes benefit from having 
separate set-ups for innovation and exnovation purposes. Delbecque and Mills suggested that an 
institutional set-up, with a non-partisan screening of innovation ideas, an independent source of funding 
of innovation or new product development, and institutionalized organizational support for testing, 
refining and marketing of a new innovation, would allow less room for conflicts and for jealously 
guarding old domains and budget positions. Adding a similar non-partisan arrangement for planning and 
execution of exnovation seems like an obvious, practical step to take.  
Along the same line, exnovation may benefit from top-level strategic support, but the authority 
of a CEO may not always be sufficient to sustain a radical exnovation measure. When dealing with 
complex and risky strategic issues, often under severe time pressure, CEOs often feel weak. They may 
feel uncertain about consequences, and they may postpone decisions – and when they finally decide to 
act it may be too late and insufficiently grounded – much as described by Kathleen Eisenhardt in the 
case of “fast strategic change”  (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989).  Some exnovation 
decisions can incur extreme consequences for the whole organization, such as in cases of interruptive 
innovations and creative destruction (as when “calling it a day” for analogue photography). Principles 
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from diversity in teams may then be added to established authority structures in order to provide for 
better grounding of decisions. Eisenhardt found that people working intensively in diverse strategic 
teams, in formal and informal settings, with a focus on “real time information”, tended to develop a 
«collective intuition» and a gut feeling for threats and opportunities. They were also better able to handle 
“constructive conflict”, and deal with ideas, nuances and criticism without loss of time or prestige. They 
might also use “frame-breaking tactics”, such as scenarios, role-playing or ”backcasting” in order to 
generate alternatives, and avoid loss of face and “not invented here” positions. Eisenhardt also found 
that such teams were able to develop a “natural rhythm” of milestones and dead-lines for ending up with 
a robust decision in time.  
Some studies emphasize the need for multiple foci and interactions among “process champions”, 
with different roles in the two journeys, respectively the innovation journey and the exnovation journey.  
In most cases, it is the importance of innovation champions that have been emphasized (Royer, 2003). 
We suggest that the concept of an exnovation champion will highlight similar commitments to abandon 
or letting go of old ideas, practices, or artifacts.  An example here is provided by Becker (2014, p. 593), 
who studied abandonment of traditional budgeting, and found that it was “..only achieved through 
skillful agency by dominant insiders”.  Such exnovation champions are not studied very often.  However, 
Ginsberg and Abrahamson (1991, p. 173) presented an important finding about “champions of change” 
in top management teams. It was primarily new members who were willing to “..counteract inertial 
forces that may block the implementation of change”.  A possible interpretation here is that new 
members were not inhibited by local attachments and local experience, and for this reason could more 
easily take the role of exnovation champion. 
Other considerations 
It is beyond the scope of the present article to initiate systematic exnovation research. But in 
addition to the areas already mentioned, we may add that the exnovation journey also may be informed 
by research findings from the general organizational change field and from abandonment and unlearning 
research, that can be replicated on exnovation issues by making them directly linked to the introduction 
of new innovations. In the area of complex adaptive systems, the study of exnovation journeys can help 
us identify roles for stage-planned and controlled exnovation processes versus emergent and non-linear 
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processes. Also, with more research, the study of exnovation challenges can be linked to specific 
innovation types and characteristic, such as single innovations versus innovation streams, radical versus 
incremental innovations, architectural/systemic versus modular/component innovations, and managerial 
versus technological innovations. Along the same line, exnovation challenges may take on different 
characterics when the pressure to innovate and change path comes from inside or outside the 
organization, from above or from below (Conway & Steward, 2009), from individuals, teams or 
commanding levels in the organization.  
Along the same line, we should also observe how issues of exnovation are at the core of much 
public debate. This include common concerns such as the transition to green energy, food without toxins, 
medicines without serious side effects, ethical and effective refugee policies, ethical mass media and 
ethical finance.  
From our proposed re-definition of exnovation, it follows that the content to be removed consists of 
ideas, practices and artifacts that somehow block the adoption of new innovations. We have noted 
Kimberly’s observation that in literature and managerial practice there seems to be a “pro-innovation 
bias”, and we have suggested that this bias goes along with an “anti-exnovation bias”: Somehow 
academics in the field have refused to make exnovation issues a specialized area in a broader discipline 
of innovation and change, with a specific vocabulary and systematic, comparable and accumulative 
research. 
CONCLUSION 
We started out this paper with a reference to John Kimberly’s early call (1981) for the study and 
practice of exnovation, and with a review of similar terms used to discuss essentially the same “phasing 
out” phenomenon. We also exposed how many authors have used the term exnovation when referring 
to phenomena that differ from what Kimberly had in mind. We pointed out an urgent need for either 
exnovating the concept of exnovation – or give it a re-definition and a re-birth.  
The scale of innovation in society, and the seeming “pro-innovation bias” coupled with an 
“exnovation conundrum” or an “anti-exnovation bias”, have lead us to suggest a redefinition of the 
exnovation concept. We have suggested that exnovation generally means that “something has to be 
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removed in order to allow space for new innovation(s)” (phenomenological definition). This means that 
we depart from Kimberly’s definition, where exnovation is only about the removal of a specific, former 
innovation. In providing space for new innovations, it is often difficult to distinguish between former 
innovations and all kinds of stuff that need to be removed.  
Specifically, we have suggested that “an exnovation is any idea, practice, or material artifact in 
the adoption unit that needs to be removed or modified in order to make room for new innovation(s)” 
(content definition). We have also suggested that “an exnovation process is a sequence of linked events, 
actions and activities undertaken in order to remove or modify ideas, practices, or material artifacts for 
the purpose of making room for new innovation(s)” (process definition). We have also compared this 
process to an “innovation journey” (Van de Ven et al., 1999). We see the exnovation journey not as a 
particular “stage gate” type stage, but rather a set of activities at various stages of a journey, and we see 
the two journeys as potentially parallel and interacting.  Finally, we have also introduced the notions of 
“removal exnovation” and “modification exnovation”, emphasizing that exnovation is about making 
room for new innovations, in whatever form that may take.  
Furthermore, we should also note that exnovation is mainly of concern to incumbent firms, and 
that exnovation decisions and execution can be more challenging the more radical or interruptive the 
new innovation is, and the more it come to challenge organizaitonal identity and emotional attachments.  
Finally, we have examined cognitive, emotional and behavioral constraints and biases, 
suggesting the “sunk cost fallacy” as a main hurdle to rational decision-making, and organizational path 
dependence and experience as a main causal factor why exnovation may be expensive and sometimes 
prohibitive. We have also suggested structural and institutional arrangements for improved exnovation 
practice, and we have listed a few examples of relevant research issues – where the potential for 
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